tionship that I want to begin this introduction of a collection of essays whose object is also, as the title indicates, genealogical. The moment is drawn from the penultimate section of the second book of the poem, from an instant in which Achille, casting his line into the water, discovers that where Plunkett has a name to which he can attach his genealogical desire, Achille himself has only ''noise,'' but then almost immediately he learns that that noise in fact has a name, that where Plunkett has a solitary ancestor, he has the Atlantic:
His shoulders are knobs of ebony. The back muscles can bulge like porpoises leaping out of this line from the forge of our memory. His hard fists enclose its mossed rope as bearded as a love-vine or a blind old man, tight as a shark's jaws, wrenching the weight, then loosening it again as the line saws his palms' sealed calluses, the logwood thighs anchor against the fast drain of the trough, and here is my tamer of horses, our only inheritance that elemental noise of the windward, unbroken breakers, Ithaca's or Africa's, all joining the ocean's voice, because this is the Atlantic now, this great design, of the triangular trade. Achille saw the ghost of his father's face shoot up at the end of the line. 1
If there is something paradigmatic about this genealogical scene (as Walcott clearly intends there to be), then it is something that is paradigmatic of more than a specifically Atlantic encounter with the mystery of origins, something that is paradigmatically contemporary (or ''postcontemporary''), something paradigmatic of that now prevalent Nietzschean/Foucauldian/ Derridean thinking of genealogy that also operates by finding ''noise'' where earlier philosophies of history sought a proper name, an ''unbroken'' sequence of ''breakage'' where, as Foucault has it, ''an uninterrupted continuity'' was thought to be, a graphematic deferral of the moment of beginning where a pure foundational presence was desired. 2 ''The origin,'' Foucault insists in his famous essay on genealogy, ''lies at a place of inevitable loss.'' Genealogical method, consequently, does not at-tempt to identify ''the exclusive generic characteristics of an individual, a sentiment, or an idea . . . rather it seeks the subtle, singular, and subindividual marks that might possibly intersect in them to form a network that is difficult to unravel.'' It is not ''the erecting of foundations: on the contrary, it disturbs what was previously thought immobile; it fragments what was thought unified; it shows the heterogeneity of what was thought consistent with itself.'' A genealogy, finally, is not, by this understanding, an ''acquisition [or] possession that grows and solidifies . . . it is an unstable assemblage of faults, fissures, and heterogeneous layers that threaten the fragile inheritor from within or from underneath.'' 3 I quote these passages from Foucault, passages whose insights, by now, inform some of our most commonly shared intellectual assumptions, not only because they eloquently and efficiently express the assumptions I also share about the nature of genealogical inquiry but also because they can be seen to describe both the nature of the genealogical and-as Walcott's poem and the essays in this special edition suggest-something of the nature of that Atlantic discourse that has begun to establish itself as an identifiable field of critical inquiry over the past fifteen to twenty years. Whatever else it has been, Atlantic discourse has articulated itself over this period as an origin-and foundation-worrying mode of critique, as an examination of those ''subtle, singular, and subindividual marks'' that collectively compose a complex transmarine ''network'' of cultural, historical, literary, and ethnographic exchanges, as a form of critique that-whether its object of study is the modern nation-state, the literary canon, religious, commemorative, or expressive practices, the constitution of corporate identities, or the formative logics of modernity itself-repeatedly ''disturbs what was previously thought immobile,'' ''fragments what was thought unified,'' and ''shows the heterogeneity of what was thought consistent with itself.'' If Atlantic discourse is thus, in Foucault's sense, a recognizably genealogical mode of discursive inquiry, then, as Walcott suggests, indeed as is implied by the uncanny familiarity with which Foucault's ''fragile inheritor'' threatened ''from within or from underneath'' finds its personification in Walcott's Achille, whose ''only inheritance'' is that unbroken ''elemental noise'' of Atlantic breakage and that ghostly apparition rising to meet him from the waters beneath his feet, such disturbances, fragmentations, and fissurings name more than a critical grammar of unsettlement, more than an intellectual project. They also name an unsettled and unsettling way of inhabiting and experiencing the modern.
To acknowledge this is to recognize a crucial doubleness central to many of the recent discourses on the Atlantic, a doubleness by which the Atlantic names both a mode of inquiry and a habitus, a critical discourse ''on'' modernity and a critical site ''within'' the modern. If Atlantic thus names something that is both a space of dwelling ''in'' and a way of reflecting ''on'' the modern, then, as Paul Gilroy's The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness suggests, such ways of posing the relationship between the Atlantic and the modern must be appended by at least one more question, a question whose recognizably genealogical form returns us to the scene from Omeros with which I began and to the problem of its and the Atlantic's paradigmatically modern status.
Gilroy's Black Atlantic is clearly, as its subtitle makes evident, a commentary ''on'' modernity. And the ''black Atlantic'' cultural territory that text describes is, as obviously, something Gilroy understands as internal to modernity. To be thus ''in'' modernity is not, however, necessarily to be ''of '' modernity, a point Gilroy makes on numerous occasions throughout the book when, borrowing a formulation from Saint Paul, he insists that his work constitutes an analysis of an expressive, intellectual, and political culture that is ''in but not necessarily of the modern, western world,'' ''in an expanded west but not completely of it,'' ''in, but not completely of, the west.'' 4 This ''in but not completely of '' structure is primarily one of Gilroy's ways of reframing the notion of double consciousness. But it also constitutes something like the genealogical mystery plot of his text, a plot many readers have taken to resolve itself in the form of an implied romance because the enigma of that ''of '' suggests its resolution by implying that if black Atlantic intellectual, cultural, and political forms are not completely ''of '' a ''west'' that is sometimes, as in the first passage I have cited, rendered dangerously interchangeable with the ''modern,'' it is perhaps because they are ''of '' an extramodern, African site of origins that somehow exists outside the network of cultural exchanges and flows that characterize the ''fractal'' cultures of the black Atlantic. To my mind, however, this implied resolution is less significant than the explicit answer Gilroy offers in the closing chapter of the book, an answer he arrives at by reframing the question, by asking, now, not whether the black Atlantic is or is not ''of '' modernity but whether modernity is ''of '' the black Atlantic. To that question, Gilroy's answer is a fairly unambiguous ''yes'': ''It is being suggested that the concentrated intensity of the slave experience is something that marked out blacks as the first truly modern people.'' 5 With that answer in mind it seems possible to return to that ''paradigmatic'' scene from Walcott's poem with which I began and to follow Gilroy's lead by reversing the question it puts to the problems of the genealogical and the modern.Viewed thus, the question it raises is not whether Achille is a paradigmatically modern subject, whether he is a paradigmatically ''fragile'' inheritor of a noisily fissured, broken, and ruptured modernity, but whether that modern conception of identity which he embodies, whether, indeed, a genealogy of modernity itself, are, in some fragmentary, fissured, heterogeneous sense, traceable to him and that centurieslong ''Atlantic now'' which he finds himself inheriting.
The foregoing comments suggest that to raise the problem of an ''Atlantic genealogy'' is to pose at least one or more of three related types of questionquestions that approximately address the ''in,'' the ''on,'' and the ''of ''; questions that consider the fissured genealogy of a particular Atlantic practice, history, institution, form, or mode of subjectivity that exists ''within'' a circumambient modernity; questions that address an Atlantic genealogy for, or an Atlantic perspective ''on,'' some problem previously apprehended as interpretable within some narrower frame of reference (typically a national frame of reference); and questions that pose the reciprocal problem of the modern genealogy ''of '' the Atlantic and the Atlantic genealogy ''of '' the modern. All the essays in this collection, in one way or another, raise such questions as they prompt us to consider that complex network of historical and cultural traffic that, as the various authors of these pieces make clear, links The Faerie Queene to the transatlantic slave trade, the slave trade to modern forms of mobile identity, mobile identity to cosmopolitan traveling theory, traveling theory to the invention and, counterintuitively, the purification of diasporic religious, cultural, and commemorative practices, such purity discourses to the contemporary resurgence of a range of cultural nationalisms all around the Atlantic Rim, and the discourses of postcolonial nationalism to the Atlantic denationalization or diasporization of Caribbean, South African, West African, and British polities and cultural forms. If, as these essays collectively suggest, the history of cultural, historical, and political exchanges across the Atlantic thus serially remakes (or perhaps, in Foucault's terms, disassembles) any number of what are commonly held to be the central forms of modernity (the nation-state, the sovereign individual, a range of ''high'' and ''low'' literary modes, etc.), that history also licenses an ongoing labor of critical reassembly, a rerouting of fixed categories of knowledge that, to take just one example from the works considered here, would permit literary scholars to assemble something like a provisional, Atlantic countercanon that runs from Edmund Spenser to Victor Headley and replaces the analysis ''of the exclusive generic characteristics'' of an individual national literature with the examination of ''the subtle, singular, and subindividual'' intersections of Renaissance epic, Caribbean romance, and yardie fiction within ''a network that [to understate matters entirely] is difficult to unravel.''
If, beyond such contigent reformulations, I can identify a specific impetus or design behind the particular collection of essays gathered here, it is, however, not one of radical reinvention but one of reconsideration and expansion-at least as this collection engages other works in this emergent field. For a number of the essays here (particularly those by Charlie Piot and J. Lorand Matory), that reconsideration takes the form of an engaged critique of Gilroy's Black Atlantic, undoubtedly the most influential and field defining of such works. The expansion I have in mind is one that seeks to enlarge the temporal, canonic, geographic, and linguistic boundaries of an Atlanticist discourse that, at least as it has taken shape in the fields of literary and cultural studies, is dominantly post-eighteenth century, Anglophone, Middle Atlantic, and extra-or countercanonical. Accordingly, the essays here engage a range of texts, histories, and events from the sixteenth to the late twentieth centuries; the Anglophone, Francophone, and Lusophone epicenters of the Atlantic; the North, Middle, and South Atlantics; and a span of texts that encompasses Renaissance epic, high modernist drama, postcolonial bildungsroman, ''minor'' literature (as Loren Kruger, following Gilles Deleuze, designates the ''post-antiapartheid'' writings she considers), 6 and what Grant Farred identifies as ''postcolonial pulp fiction.'' Editorial design invariably reconfronts the contingencies of editorship, and there is inevitably much that is not considered here. Perhaps that is partially appropriate, however-or, at least, appropriate to my understanding of the central terms under investigation here, appropriate to my conception of both Atlantic and modernity. For what I intend by Atlantic is not a comprehensive, encyclopedic, or bounded expanse, set of histories, or range of experiences but, rather, something that is closer to a sequence of assemblages than to a totality, though a series of assemblages (and an invitation to assemblage) with an organizing point of reference. The Atlantic whose scenes of exchange and networks of relation this collection addresses is not, thus, an even or a delimited territory but, in Stuart Hall and Paul Gilroy's terms, a set of intersecting routes or, perhaps, a series of Althusserian ''conjunctures.'' The object of this collection, in other words, is not to provide a comprehensive map of the cross-Atlantic but to attend to a series of moments in which an array of African, Caribbean, North American, South American, or West European cultural, narrative, literary, historical, and ideological practices converge. Indeed, it is my sense that Atlantic discourse necessarily constitutes less an examination of a determinate cultural ''region'' than an analysis of such ''arrays.'' This does not mean that such moments cannot be ''arrayed'' alongside one another or that they are radically discontinuous with one another, only that an Atlantic modernity is more fully an oscillating than a continuous phenomenon and that to speak of the Atlantic is to speak of a sequence of intensities, to speak of experiences, forms, histories, and knowledges more intensely present at some moments than at others (not necessarily the exclusive moment of their ''happening'': as Achille's ghostly encounter indicates, such moments are frequently made present in the present as aftereffects, experiences of belatedness, intimations of the noncontemporaneity of the contemporaneous).
Each of those ''moments'' (at least for the purposes of this collection) is situated, however, within that larger moment that I have been calling the moment of modernity; a moment whose moment of ''beginning'' I join Gilroy in associating with the rise of transatlantic slavery, in part because to begin there is also to join Foucault in identifying ''the origin'' as an experience and a place ''of inevitable loss.'' Modernity is more, however, than a period of time, more than an expanse of time running roughly from the sixteenth century to the present. It is also, or it has also been taken to be, a form of time. And it is with some brief comments on what sort of time modernity has been understood to form and on the type of time consciousness that I understand to be paradigmatically ''Atlantic'' that I wish to conclude this introduction. I wish to do so because it is, I believe, in an investigation of temporal codes and logics that an Atlantic discourse can perhaps most fully perform the double labor of articulating itself as a counterdiscourse in and on modernity while, simultaneously, discovering in its fragmentary, hetero-geneous protocols of assemblage and disassemblage an Atlantic genealogy of the modern.
One place to ''begin'' such an argument is, once more, with Walcott, with his reformulation of Achille's inheritance as an inheritance not simply of noise but of ''the Atlantic now,'' a formulation I choose to read as one in which the Atlantic functions not as a noun or a proper name but as an adjectival qualifier of now. Read thus, what Achille inherits is, precisely, a form of time, a type of contemporaneity, a complex, enigmatic, Atlantic ''now.'' If that is the case, then that ''now'' implies a contemporaneity that is radically noncontemporary with itself, a ghost-haunted, apparitional now that is simultaneously the moment of loss, the long after-history of loss, and the moment of the discovery of loss: a centuries-long now that, to shorthand my argument, functions in the poem as something like an analogue of Derrida's hauntological contemporaneity or Gilroy's ''nonsynchronous'' time of diaspora. But to get some sense of what that might mean and of what might be at stake in reading the Atlantic now as a nonsynchronous now, we need to get some better sense of what that term implies, of its own critical genealogy, and of the work it performs as a countergenealogy in, on, and of the modern.
Variously reidentified as a ''syncopated,'' ''disjunct,'' ''broken,'' or ''ruptured'' order of time within the closing chapters of The Black Atlantic, Gilroy's concept of nonsynchronous time (perhaps the crucial concept of the second half of the book) constitutes a knowledge and experience of time in which the present is present to more than itself, in which the now finds itself serially inheriting, replaying, and transmitting a traumatic ''past'' that is not, in fact, past. Central to his text, the concept of the nonsynchronous is by no means the exclusive property of that text but something that exhibits the signs of serial affiliations and a multiple genealogy, entailing as it does at once a hauntology in Derrida's terms, a conjunction in Althusser's, a serialization in Fernand Braudel's, and a mode of historicism in Fredric Jameson's. If to think the black Atlantic through the figure of the nonsynchronous is thus to think ''double consciousness'' as not only a racial or cultural but also a temporal condition, then it is also to think the nonsynchronous in a disunified relation to itself, as at once a Derridean phenomenology, an Althusserian philosophy of history, a Braudelian longue durée, and a Jamesonian theory of form. It is to think the nonsynchronous not simply as another name for the return of the repressed but as a type of heterochronicity, as a coexistence within the given moments of the present of a variegated array of mutually disjointed temporal orders.
If the Jamesonian cast of Gilroy's text is the most evident (on my understanding, Gilroy's hermeneutic of the ''changing same'' is roughly analogous to Jameson's mode of genre critique: in either case what we are urged to discover at the level of cultural form is the persistence of the prior forms of a mode within its present form, a persistence that makes any text a sort of ghost text and renders the work of formal analysis a way of attending to the noncontemporaneity of contemporary forms of culture), 7 then there is also a sort of genealogical line-or at least a retrospectively assemblable genealogical line-running backward from Gilroy's black Atlantic to Braudel's Mediterranean by way of Althusser's essay ''The Concept of Historical Time'' in Reading Capital. In that essay, Althusser takes issue with modern philosophies of history, particularly Hegel's, though not simply in order to reject an understanding of history as the continuous, progressive, teleological unfolding of time but to interrogate the maneuver which enables that understanding. Hegel's strategy, Althusser argues, is to make a series of cuts through time, cuts that permit him to construct what Althusser calls an ''essential section,'' a sort of synchronic slice of time that reveals an entire series of historical elements all of which ''co-exist in one and the same time, one and the same present, and are therefore contemporaneous with one another in one and the same present.'' 8 From the moment of Kant's ''What Is Enlightenment?'' onward, as Foucault suggests in another celebrated essay, such an order of time has been construed both as the paradigmatic time of modernity and as the object investigated by the philosophical discourses of and on modernity. 9 Modernity, on this account, is both the discovery of such a radically synchronized present and the globalization of that self-contemporary present, the distribution across the surface of the globe of the homogenizing, leveling, everywhere available and everywhere identical time of the modern.
But time, like the social whole, is not, Althusser insists, at one with or contemporary with itself. Rather, it is ''constituted by a certain type of complexity,'' constellated by a heterogeneous array of local regimes of time, the times, among others, of the body, of production, of consumption, of art, of philosophy, of politics, and of scientific knowledge, each of which is ''punc-tuated'' by its own ''peculiar rhythms.'' 10 Time is thus, for Althusser, something like the novel was for Mikhail Bakhtin: a heterotopic system in which the mutual conjunction of divergent discourses generates a complex structure that is at once heteroglossic and heterochronic. For Althusser, the task of the philosophy of history is not simply to differentiate these ''nonsynchronous'' orders of time (as he, following Ernst Bloch, also calls them, 11 and as Gilroy, following both Althusser and Bloch, will later call the time systems of the black Atlantic) but to read their specificity as ''differential,'' that is, to attend to what Althusser alternately calls the ''peculiar co-existence'' and the ''conjunction'' of these orders of time, to address ''the differential relations'' that conjoin these differences within something he continues to identify as a ''whole.'' 12 Nonsynchronous time is thus for Althusser the name not only for the differentiation of time but for the relation of difference. And it is here, I think, that Althusser's work gestures both back toward Braudel's annaliste historiography of the Mediterranean and forward to Gilroy's black Atlantic: what Althusser does not, in fact, risk, but what Gilroy does provisionally attempt, is the mapping of something like an annaliste ''whole,'' though one composed not as a unity but as the conjunction of these related differences. The Black Atlantic might well be read, in these terms, as a postscriptive and anticipatory ''transcoding'' of Althusser and Braudel, on one hand, and Jameson and Derrida, on the other; as a temporalization of Jameson's ''relation of difference'' and a situating of Derrida's ''hauntological''; as a way of reading the Atlantic as the site of the ''peculiar co-existence'' and fraught ''conjunction'' of ''different times and rhythms.'' 13
To speak of a conjunction, however, is, of course, again to speak of Braudel, something of which Althusser is well aware. Indeed, Althusser credits Braudel as one of the historians on whose work he has drawn, one of the few historians who acknowledges that ''there are different times in history, varieties of time, long times, medium times and short times.'' 14 The allusion to The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II and particularly to the celebrated preface to that work is evident, but finally, Althusser expresses his dissatisfaction with Braudel for doing no more than ''observing that there are different times'' and for failing to ''relate'' these differential times ''to the concept of their difference.'' 15 Gilroy's relation to a Braudelian theory of time is, if anything, more ambiguous than Althusser's. Most fundamentally, I believe, their investigations of the temporal overlap and diverge with regard to the question of the series and the event. Braudel's stated antipathy for events and for event history is well known. The historian's more proper object he suggests is the series, the recurrent, repetitive performances through which social life is organized and enacted. And it is by attending to the series that Braudel can deduce the longue durée, that he can periodize time as, at times, a centuries-long contemporaneity. 16 In a sense, Gilroy's work is also an analysis of a long contemporaneity, a long Atlantic modernity that also emerges from the serial reenactment of an organizing event. But because for Gilroy the crucial event in question is the ''event'' of the middle passage, an event that he suggests recurs as both experience and memory, an event whose recurrence as memory renders the contemporary black Atlantic world contemporary with its apparently noncontemporaneous past, the relation of that serialized event to a black Atlantic knowledge and experience of time is, finally, less Braudelian than Derridean, less what structures a longue durée than what animates a hauntology.
And it is that hauntological time that, I believe, Achille finds himself inheriting as, pulling ''his father's ghost'' from the line he has dropped into the ''Atlantic now,'' he discovers himself to be the inheritor not only of a noisy history of breakage but of a nonsynchronous, heterochronic order of time that exists as a countercurrent within and a countercommentary on that smoothly homogeneous and relentlessly homogenizing form of time that Kant identified with, and as, the advent of modernity. A countercurrent within and a countercommentary on the time of the modern, such a serially reiterated Atlantic now also, however, contains as one of its secrets the possibility that it, rather than the sublimely empty homogeneity of Kant's ''contemporary,'' is the graphematic wellspring of the modern, that it is in the ghost-crowded waters of the Atlantic and in someone like Achille's latetwentieth-century experience of the fissures, fractures, and noncontemporaneities of our inordinately long contemporaneity that we might find the paradigm of a four-hundred-year modernity's ongoing encounter with itself.
Whatever else it has been, the Atlantic has entered the fields of critical inquiry as an allegory of the ghost Achille pulls from the waters beneath his feet, as the belatedly encountered secret sharer in, and perhaps the secret of, a modernity whose ''business,'' like any good ghost's, is resolutely ''unfinished.'' The essays that follow neither exhaust that business nor lay either of these ghosts to rest. In charting their varied Atlantic genealogies, however, they do give us some fuller sense of what it might mean to discover ourselves, like Achille, as inheritors of this Atlantic, now. What this model [of genre] implies is that in its emergent, strong form a genre is essentially a socio-symbolic message, or in other terms, that form is immanently and intrinsically an ideology in its own right. When such forms are reappropriated and refashioned in quite different social and cultural contexts, this message persists and must be functionally reckoned into the new form. . . . The ideology of form itself, thus sedimented, persists into the later, more complex structure. The notion of the text as a synchronic unity of structurally contradictory or heterogeneous elements, generic patterns and discourses (what we may call, following Ernst Bloch, the Ungleichzeitigkeit or non-synchronic ''uneven development'' within a single textual structure) now suggests that even Frye's notion of displacement can be rewritten as a conflict between the older deep-structural form and the contemporary materials and generic systems in which it seeks to inscribe and to reassert itself. . . . Properly used, genre theory must always in one way or another project a model of coexistence or tension between several generic modes or strands. . . . Philosophy as the problematisation of a presentness, the interrogation by philosophy of this present-ness of which it is part and relative to which it is obliged to locate itself: this may well be the characteristic trait of philosophy
